Police Excessive Force Case Moves Forward

Trial to Decide if Officer Used Reasonable Force in Taser Incident

The New York Law Journal by Joel Stashenko - December 30, 2011

Saul W. Hollad sufficiently raised triable issues about the actions that culminated in his being tasseled by a Poughkeepsie [New York] policeman to preclude the city's motion for summary judgment on several of Mr. Holland's state common-law claims, a unanimous panel of the Second Department ruled last week.

Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 3981/08 - Appellate Division, Second Department - Cite as: Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 3981/08, NYLJ 1202536920434, at *1 (App. Div., 2nd, Decided December 20, 2011) Before: Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickerson, Cohen, JJ. - Decided: December 20, 2011 - 2010-05610, 2010-09699 - ATTORNEYS - For Appellants: McCabe & Mack, LLP, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (David L. Posner of counsel). - For Respondent: Joseph Petito, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.

DECISION & ORDER - In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries and for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC §1983, the defendants City of Poughkeepsie, City of Poughkeepsie Police Department, and Michael Labrada appeal (1), as limited by their notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Brands, J.), dated May 19, 2010, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, fourth, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada, the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendant City of Poughkeepsie, and so much of the third cause of action as alleged state and federal claims based upon false arrest and false imprisonment insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada, and (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated September 13, 2010, as, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination in the order dated May 19, 2010, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, fourth, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada, the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendant City of Poughkeepsie, and so much of the third cause of action as alleged state and federal claims based upon false arrest and false imprisonment insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada. ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated May 19, 2010, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as the portions of that order appealed from were superseded by the order dated September 13, 2010, made, in effect, upon reargument; and it is further, ORDERED that the order dated September 13, 2010, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof, in effect, upon reargument, adhering to so much of the original determination in the order dated May 19, 2010, as denied those branches of the motion of the defendants City of Poughkeepsie, City of Poughkeepsie Police Department, and Michael Labrada which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first, third, and fourth causes of action as alleged violations of 42 USC §1983 insofar as asserted against the defendant City of Poughkeepsie, the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendant City of Poughkeepsie, and the second and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada, and substituting there for a provision, upon reargument, vacating so much of the order dated May 19, 2010, as denied those branches of the motion of the defendants City of Poughkeepsie, City of Poughkeepsie Police Department, and Michael Labrada which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first, third, and fourth causes of action as alleged violations of 42 USC §1983 insofar as asserted against the defendant City of Poughkeepsie, the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the City of Poughkeepsie, and the second and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants City of Poughkeepsie and Michael Labrada, and thereupon granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order dated September 13, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. This action to recover damages for personal injuries and civil rights violations arises from an incident involving the plaintiff, an epileptic, who refused transport to the hospital after having suffered four grand mal seizures, two of which were witnessed by a paramedic and an emergency medical technician (hereinafter the EMT). According to deposition testimony, after the paramedic administered valium and the plaintiff partially recovered from his seizures, the paramedic called his supervising physician, who instructed him to transport the plaintiff to the hospital because a narcotic had been administered. When the plaintiff refused to go, the EMT called the defendant City of Poughkeepsie Police Department (hereinafter the police department) for assistance. Upon responding to the scene, the defendant Officer Michael Labrada attempted to convince the plaintiff to go to the hospital. The plaintiff became agitated, pulled the monitor leads off his chest, pulled out his IV, and exited the back of the ambulance while screaming obscenities. Labrada and the EMT testified that the plaintiff "lunged" at Labrada. A struggle ensued, during which Labrada attempted to restrain the plaintiff and warned him that he would be arrested if he did not stop. When the plaintiff failed to respond to these warnings, Labrada used his taser to incapacitate the plaintiff. Additional police officers arrived, the plaintiff was handcuffed, and he was transported to the hospital in custody for, inter alia, disorderly conduct. Labrada testified inconsistently at his deposition as to whether the EMT and paramedic were the only people present in the vicinity while these events were occurring. The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the City of Poughkeepsie, the police department, and Labrada (hereinafter collectively the defendants), alleging various New York common-law causes of action and federal civil rights violations under 42 USC §1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Insofar as relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court denied those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the state and federal claims under the first, second, fourth, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada, the state and federal claims under the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the City, and so much of the third cause of action as alleged state and federal claims based upon false arrest and false imprisonment insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada. The defendants moved for leave to reargue these branches of their motion, and the Supreme Court, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied these branches of the motion. The defendants appeal, and we modify. The first four causes of action are premised upon allegations of excessive force (first cause of action), violation of the right to "bodily integrity" by the use of excessive force and arrest without just cause (second cause of action), false arrest and false imprisonment (third cause of action), and assault and battery (fourth cause of action). Each of these causes of action alleged that the City and Labrada should be held liable pursuant to both New York common law and 42 USC §1983.

Addressing first the New York common-law claims, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing those claims under the first, third, and fourth causes of action insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada. With respect to the first cause of action, "[c]laims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness" (Ostrander v. State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464; see Campagna v. Arleo, 25 AD3d 528, 529). That analysis "requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake" (Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386, 396 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The use of force must be judged "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight," recognizing that "police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation" (id. at 396-397; see Campagna v. Arleo, 25 AD3d at 529). Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide (see Harvey v. Brandt, 254 AD2d 718, 719). If found to be objectively reasonable, the officer's actions are privileged under the doctrine of qualified immunity (see Hayes v. City of Amsterdam, 2 AD3d 1139, 1140; Higgins v. City of Oneonta, 208 AD2d 1067, 1071 n 1). Here, the defendants failed to eliminate a triable issue of fact as to whether Labrada's use of a taser to restrain the plaintiff, either to arrest him or to restrain him for his own safety, was excessive (cf. Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F3d 1270, 1278, cert denied 543 US 988; Diederich v. Nyack Hosp., 49AD3d 491, 494; Gagliano v. County of Nassau, 31 AD3d 375, 376). Moreover, unlike the claims pursuant to 42USC §1983, a municipality may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employee while acting within the scope of his or her employment (see Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d 1049, 1051; Ashley v. City of New York, 7 AD3d 742, 743). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as alleged excessive force pursuant to New York common law insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada (see Harvey v. Brandt, 254 AD2d at 718-719). The third cause of action alleged false arrest and false imprisonment, which are two names for the same tort (see Lee v. City of New York, 272 AD2d 586; Jackson v. Police Dept. of City of N.Y., 86AD2d 860, 860-861). To establish a cause of action alleging false arrest under New York common law, a plaintiff must show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him [or her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Lee v. City of New York, 272 AD2d at 586; see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456, cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 US 929). Probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest (see Fortunato v. City of New York, 63 AD3d 880). Where the arrest is made without a warrant, "a presumption arises that it was unlawful, and the burden of proving that the arrest was otherwise privileged is cast upon the defendant" (Tsachalis v. City of Mount Vernon, 293 AD2d 525, 525 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 NY2d at 458; Gagliano v. County of Nassau, 31 AD3d at 376). In general, the existence or absence of probable cause is a question of fact and "becomes a question of law to be decided by the court only where there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn there from" (Fortunato v. City of New York, 63 AD3d at 880 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 420). Here, the plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct based upon his engagement in "fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" with "the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof" (Penal Law §240.20[1]). Although he was also charged with obstructing a firefighting operation pursuant to Penal Law §195.15(2), probable cause for that offense was lacking because no firefighting operation was occurring. With respect to disorderly conduct, there was evidence that the plaintiff was engaged in tumultuous behavior, but a triable issue of fact remains as to whether a reasonable officer could interpret the plaintiff's behavior as being motivated by an "intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" (Penal Law§ 240.20[1]). In addition, although the plaintiff might nevertheless have recklessly caused public inconvenience, the defendants failed to eliminate a triable issue of fact as to whether the "public" was inconvenienced by submitting, in support of their motion, Labrada's deposition testimony, which was equivocal as to the presence or absence of bystanders other than the ambulance crew. These triable issues of fact with respect to whether Labrada's evaluation of probable cause was objectively reasonable preclude an award of summary judgment in favor of Labrada on the ground of qualified immunity (see Malley v. Briggs, 475 US 335, 340; Diederich v. Nyack Hosp., 49 AD3d at 493; Simpkin v. City of Troy, 224 AD2d 897, 898). Moreover, the City may be held vicariously liable under the state law claim for torts committed by Labrada acting within the scope of his employment (see Eckhardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1051; Ashley v. City of New York, 7 AD3d 742, 743). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the third cause of action as alleged a New York common-law claim of false arrest and false imprisonment insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada (see Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 [Smith, J., concurring]). The fourth cause of action alleged assault and battery. "To recover damages for battery, a plaintiff must prove that there was bodily contact, that the contact was offensive, i.e., wrongful under all of the circumstances, and intent to make the contact without the plaintiff's consent" (Higgins v. Hamilton, 18 AD3d 436, 436). In light of the defendants' failure to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Labrada's use of the taser was excessive or objectively reasonable under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the New York common-law claims of assault and battery insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada. With respect to the federal claims under the first, third, and fourth causes of action, 42 USC §1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured" (Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1051-1052 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d 700, 703). The Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the federal civil rights claims under the first, third, and fourth causes of action insofar as asserted against Labrada because, as noted, the defendants failed to eliminate a triable issue of fact on the issues of excessive force, false arrest, and assault and battery, which may properly form the basis of a claim under 42 USC §1983 (see Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F2d 34, 36; Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1051; Delgado v. City of New York, 86 AD3d 502, 511). The first, third, and fourth causes of action, as well as the seventh cause of action, also asserted federal claims against the City. "A municipality is not liable under 42 USC §1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents" (Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d at 703; see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694), or "solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability" (Lopez v. Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552; see Connick v. Thompson, ___ US ___, ___, 131 S Ct 1350, 1359 [2011]; Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1052; Alex LL. v. Department of Social Servs. of Albany County, 60 AD3d 199, 205). Thus, to the extent that the first, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action sought to impose vicarious liability on the City for the actions of Labrada pursuant to 42 USC §1983, the City is entitled to summary judgment dismissing those portions of the causes of action. To the extent that the first, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action sought to impose liability on the City as an entity for its own alleged violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, such liability may be imposed only by establishing "a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation" (Canton v. Harris, 489US 378, 385; see Connick v. Thompson, ___ US at ___, 131 S Ct at 1359 [2011]; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US at 694). The plaintiff must show that "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional either implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers or has occurred pursuant to a practice so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law" (Maio v. Kralik, 70 AD3d 1, 10-11 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 AD3d at 1052). Applying this principle, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the federal claims asserted against it under the first, third, and fourth causes of action, insofar as such claims were premised upon allegations of Labrada's use of excessive force, false arrest, and assault and battery, respectively. The City adduced evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, the lack of a causal link between its policies, customs, or practices, and the alleged constitutional violations. In opposition thereto, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The seventh cause of action alleged, inter alia, that the City was negligent in its training of police officers. Under "limited circumstances," proof of a municipality's "failure to train can [be the basis for] liability under §1983" (Canton v. Harris, 489 US at 387, 387 n 6). However, "[o]nly where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under §1983" (id. at 389; see Connick v. Thompson, ___ US at ___, 131 S Ct at 1359-1360 [2011]; Pendleton v. City of New York, 44 AD3d 733, 736-737). Three requirements must be met before liability may be imposed. First, "the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows 'to a moral certainty' that [his or] her employees will confront a given situation," for liability will not be imposed based upon failure to train for "rare or unforeseen events" (Walker v. City of New York, 974 F2d 293, 297, cert denied 507 US 961, 507 US 972, quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 US at 390 n 10). In this respect, "[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 'ordinarily necessary'" (Connick v. Thompson, ___ US at ___, 131 S Ct at 1360, quoting Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 US 397, 409). Second, "the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation" (Walker v. City of New York, 974 F2d at 297). Finally, "the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights" (id. at 298). Where the plaintiff establishes all three elements, "it can be said with confidence that the policymaker should have known that inadequate training or supervision was 'so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need'" (id., quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 US at 390).

Here, municipal officials could certainly expect that police officers would be confronted with individuals who needed medical assistance and could further expect that some individuals would refuse medical assistance. However, a situation such as this — where an individual received some medical assistance, but then violently refused further treatment and transport to the hospital that was needed in light of the treatment already rendered — is the sort of "rare or unforeseen event[]" for which liability under 42USC §1983 does not arise (Walker v. City of New York, 974 F2d at 297; see Connick v. Thompson, ___ US at ___, 131 S Ct at 1360 [2011]). Similarly, while this situation surely presented the police officers with a "difficult choice," it was not "a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult" (Walker v. City of New York, 974 F2d at 297). In sum, while training in dealing with situations like the one at bar might be desirable, any failure on the part of the City to offer its police officers such training cannot be characterized as "deliberate indifference" (Canton v. Harris, 489 US at 389 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Connick v. Thompson, ___ US at ___, 131 S Ct at 1359 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the alleged violation of 42 USC §1983 based upon negligent training of police officers insofar as asserted against it under the seventh cause of action, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition thereto. Further, as correctly conceded by the plaintiff, the New York common-law claim of negligent training asserted against the City under the seventh cause of action must also be dismissed. Generally where, as here, the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, the employer may be held liable for the employee's torts under a theory of respondeat superior, and no claim may proceed against the employer for negligent supervision or training under New York common law (see Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87AD3d at 1051; Talavera v. Arbit, 18 AD3d 738, 738; Karoon v. New York City Tr. Auth., 241 AD2d 323). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have, upon reargument, vacated so much of the original determination as denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing both the state and federal claims premised upon allegations of negligent training under the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the City, and thereupon granted that branch of the motion. On appeal, the plaintiff has properly conceded that the thirteenth cause of action to recover damages for negligent assumption of a duty should be dismissed as duplicative insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada. The second cause of action arose from the same facts as the first and third causes of action and did not allege distinct damages; therefore, that cause of action should have been dismissed as duplicative insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada (see Tsafatinos v. Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749, 750; Leonard v. Reinhardt, 20 AD3d 510).

In sum, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the original determination as denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the New York common-law claims insofar as asserted against the City under the first, third, and fourth causes of action, and the New York common law and 42 USC §1983 claims insofar as asserted against Labrada under the first, third, and fourth causes of action. However, the Supreme Court should have, in effect, upon reargument, vacated so much of the original determination as denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the second and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the City and Labrada, so much of the first, third, and fourth causes of action as alleged violations of 42 USC §1983 insofar as asserted against the City, and the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the City, and thereupon granted those branches of the motion. DILLON, J.P., ANGIOLILLO, DICKERSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.

Justice Denied and Taxpayers Lose When Bondsmen Abuse Privileges

Editorial: Taxpayers lose when bondsmen abuse privileges
The Dallas Morning News - EDITORIAL - December 26, 2011

A bail bondsman’s operation is one that the general public seems happy to know little about. It’s a world of lowlife situations, jail cells, police and trouble — stuff that most of us try to stay as far away from as possible. But ignorance definitely isn’t bliss when bondsmen’s abuses of the legal system cost taxpayers millions of dollars. As Dallas Morning News staff writers Ed Timms and Kevin Krause reported last week, a powerful lobby representing Texas bail bondsmen has, for years, pushed through legislation in Austin that allows them to artificially manipulate the value of property they use as collateral on bail bonds. This unethical nonsense must stop. Courts typically allow arrested people to get out of jail until trial by posting a bail bond backed by collateral property owned by the bondsman. It’s in the bondsman’s interest to cite the highest valuation possible for this property, since the system allows him to post 10 times that value to cover clients’ bail. And, of course, he profits from the percentage his clients must pay him in return. Higher property values should mean higher taxes for the bondsman. But the bail-bond lobby in Austin, with its generous campaign contributions, has won wide leeway from the Legislature to manipulate the appraisal process. These properties are allowed by law to have two values — one set by a private appraiser hired by the bail bondsman for bail-posting purposes and the other set by the county central appraisal district for taxation. Dallas County is typical of a statewide bail-bond system rife with abuse as bondsmen play both sides. The private appraiser inflates the property value to help the bondsman’s business, but when it comes to the county’s appraisal, unethical bondsmen have histories of filing multiple protests to get the valuation reduced to a fraction of the private appraiser’s estimate. They are gaming the system at your expense, especially because, if the arrested person skips bail or the bondsman goes bankrupt, the collateral becomes the government’s property. What appears on paper to be very valuable can turn out to be junk. You, the taxpayer, wind up footing the bill when the government gets stuck with that property. When bondsmen pay far less than they should in property taxes, you, in effect, pay the difference. Don’t be surprised. This is just the latest in a series of reports by Timms and Krause on how bondsmen are abusing the system while county regulators either look the other way or are legally powerless to take action. It’s doubtful that the bondsmen will grow a conscience and self-correct. The Legislature created this mess, and it’s up to lawmakers to fix it. Among key findings of The Dallas Morning News investigation: In order to avoid forfeiting collateral property, bondsmen falsely claim rearrest of clients who jumped bail; courts do little to verify claims. Current and former bondsmen and attorneys authorized to write bonds owed the county $35 million in unpaid judgments. The county lacks a system to track bond forfeiture cases to make sure final judgments are paid on time. Until recently, Dallas County was charging bondsmen interest-free, bargain rates for fees owed when clients jumped bail. Judges and the district attorney’s office have been letting bondsmen off the hook for court judgments against them, often without explanation.

Former Detective Gets 26 Months in Federal Prison

Ex-Washington Park police officer going to prison for fraud, lying
STLtoday.com - December 9, 2011

EAST ST. LOUIS • Former Washington Park police Det. Kim L. McAfee was ordered Friday to spend 26 months in federal prison and pay more than $73,000 in restitution and court assessments for crimes committed in his private security business and in his official capacity. In addition, his plea agreement bars McAfee, 48, of East St. Louis, from ever working as a police officer again. McAfee also has been the subject of an investigation since a witness in a St. Clair County murder case alleged that he bribed her to lie about seeing him at the scene of the killing of Washington Park's mayor. As owner of KLM Loss Prevention Inc., McAfee paid employees less than he claimed under federally subsidized contracts with East St. Louis School District 189 and the East St. Louis Housing Authority, then pocketed the difference, officials said. He also was accused of under-paying overtime and failing to pay back wages, and telling lies on forms and to investigators. On Sept. 13, U.S. District Judge William D. Stiehl accepted McAfee's guilty plea to 16 counts of making false statements, 15 of mail fraud, three each of wire fraud and falsifying records and one count of lying to FBI agents investigating a possible civil rights violation. In Friday's sentencing hearing in court in East St. Louis, Stiehl ordered McAfee to pay $69,274.36 in restitution — $66,928.17 of it to employees — and $3,800 in assessments. The civil rights case involves an incident in which McAfee shot into a vehicle stopped at a BP service station in Washington Park, held the two men who were inside, then released them without charges about 24 hours later. McAfee told the FBI he thought he had seen a drug transaction, ordered the car's driver to stop and fired out of concern for nearby pedestrians if the car kept going. The two men, not seriously hurt, denied drug activity, officials said, and no evidence of it was found. McAfee's sentence includes paying $2,346.19 as compensation for a chipped tooth suffered by one of the men, damage to the car and towing and impound fees. "He operated as a crook with a badge," U.S. Attorney Stephen R. Wigginton said in a prepared statement. "He violated his oath to uphold the very laws that he flaunted. He cheated low income employees in an economically disadvantaged area. He lied to the FBI agents who were investigating a very troubling shooting incident. "His prosecution should put other police officers, public officials, and business leaders on notice that we will aggressively investigate and charge cases of fraud and corruption." Aaron "Chill" Jackson was on trial in October in the 2010 murder of Washington Park Mayor John Thornton when a key eyewitness, LaQueshia Jackson, told prosecutors outside court that McAfee bribed her to testify that he was not present when Thornton was shot. Officials pledged to investigate. Judge Milton Wharton sent the jury home and ordered a retrial for Jackson, no relation to the witness, in February.

Prosecutors Offer Ticket-Fix Cop 18 Years

Bronx police officer at heart of parking ticket-fixing scandal gets a plea deal offer from district attorney
The New York Daily News by Kevin Deutsch & Erin Durkin - December 9, 2011

Prosecutors offer alleged crooked cop, who'll serve 50 years if convicted, 18 years in jail if he pleads guilty

Ticket-fixing cop suspect Jose Ramos has been offered a plea deal on a slew of charges. Prosecutors offered the Bronx cop at the center of the ticket-fixing scandal a plea deal Friday - 18 years in jail instead of the 50 he faces if convicted on all charges. Officer Jose Ramos is facing 26 counts that include attempted robbery, transporting what he believed to be massive a shipment of heroin in his squad car while in uniform, selling stolen goods andcounterfeit CDs and DVDs, and other crimes. Under the deal, he would also get five years of supervision following his release, prosecutors said. The 17-year veteran, who worked the midnight shift at the 40th precinct, is accused of using the two Bronx barbershops he inherited from his father as a front for drug deals - all the while relying on his badge for protection. Authorities built a case against him by placing in undercover officer trained in cutting hair in one of the shops. He apparently sunk much of the proceeds into illegal gambling, using a bookie to make high-stakes wagers on baseball, football, basketball and hockey - sometimes for several thousand dollars a pop, according to an internal NYPD memo summarizing phone taps. The investigation into the accused crooked cop - in which he was caught on tape discussing fixing summonses in exchange for gifts - triggered a massive NYPD ticket fixing scandal that led to the indictment of Ramos and 15 other cops and has roiled the department. Authorities said the cops would make summonses vanish before they reached court, or lean on Patrolmen's Benevolent Association members to lie in court and get the tickets thrown out. Ramos and the other cops pled not guilty in October. Ramos was held on a hefty $500,000 bail. He will weigh the plea offer with his lawyer before making a decision. kdeutsch@nydailynews.com

Playing Politics With Police Chiefs A Costly Gamble

Playing Politics With Police Chiefs A Costly Gamble
The Connecticut Law Tribune by Karen Lee Torre - December 5, 2011

East Haven’s (now former) Democratic Mayor April Capone got what was coming to her. Last month, the town’s voters booted her out of office, replacing her with Republican Joseph Maturo. A prominent campaign issue was Capone’s treatment of East Haven Police Chief Lenny Gallo, and her consequent squandering of hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars on what many believed to be a personal feud. That is hardly uncommon. Police chiefs too often find themselves targeted by newly elected mayors who prefer to award the powerful job to a political crony, one who will of necessity be the mayor’s lapdog. With that, a mayor can more easily get tickets “fixed,” protect a relative, crony, or a friend’s kid from arrest, and worse. Capone did not appoint Gallo; she inherited him. Sometimes, a police or fire chief irks union leaders and members by strictly enforcing work rules, and attempting to reign in sick leave and workers’ compensation abuse. The unions give money to the mayor’s campaign, work the polls, and the mayor agrees to get rid of the chief. It has happened. Long ago, and in the public interest, the Connecticut legislature acted on this problem. State law does not permit chiefs to be employed and dismissed at will. It protects them against politicians by requiring just cause for dismissal. A chief has a right to timely and specific charges, and an opportunity to be heard. To further protect chiefs against trumped-up charges of misconduct or contrived allegations of administrative incompetence, a chief may appeal the discharge to superior court, where an impartial judge can review the matter. Gallo joined other of the state’s police chiefs who fought back, including former New Haven chief Ben DeLieto and Hamden’s former chief, John Ambrogio. New Haven voters, upset with how DeLieto was treated, later elected him mayor. For causing and losing a long, costly personal battle against Ambrogio, former Hamden mayor John Carusone became an ex-mayor. At various picnics, parties and retirement dinners over the past year, I had occasion to talk to a lot of East Haveners about this. To a man and a woman, they thought the racial profiling allegations against their police department were crapola, politically motivated, and contrived, and they were furious at Capone for so quickly and without proof aligning herself with those who would profit from making those allegations, at enormous financial risk to taxpayers. For throwing a chief under the bus in the process, she is now out of a job. Good. She deserves it. At a time of fiscal crisis, Capone was burning public money on this feud. New Mayor Joe Maturo promised voters he would stop the nonsense and pull the plug on paying three police chief salaries, and do it quick. He made good on that promise. Noting that no chief should be kept home for a year and eight months without the letter and spirit of the law being followed, Maturo reinstated Gallo. East Haven voters want the laws enforced, criminals nabbed, motor vehicle offenders cited. They don’t want their cops, and more importantly their police chief, to be afraid to do their jobs because of fear of getting sued, fired or accused of “profiling.” Whether Gallo and his officers will succumb to that fear remains to be seen, but I am sure that those who stand to profit one way or the other from racial profiling charges would rather have a collaborating April Capone and a stooge for a police chief. Politicians are responsible for the emerging populations of illegal aliens in our midst. Mayor John DeStefano declared New Haven a sanctuary city, making it a magnet for thousands of illegals, many of them poor. Now his budget officials acknowledge that the city is crumbling under a financially unsustainable “at risk” population. “Racial profiling” has become a political tool used by ethnic groups to instill a fear in cops of being accused of racism if they stop a minority with an expired or phony plate. We need more Frank Rizzos among the ranks of police chiefs. On my summer reading list was a biography of the legendary Philadelphia chief, a gift from his son, Frank Rizzo Jr., now a Republican councilman in Philly. Rizzo was elected mayor despite the hysteria from left-wingers over his aggressive and no-holds-barred law enforcement as chief, and notwithstanding persistent allegations of racial profiling (which Rizzo of course dismissed as expected rhetoric from the guilty). Rizzo couldn’t care less what the liberals said. “When I’m elected mayor,” Rizzo said, “I’m going to give the Henry Avenue Bridge concession to one of the reporters. He’ll charge six-fifty a head to the liberals who want to jump off. He’ll make a fortune.” But of the many notable quotes Rizzo’s biographers attributed to him, the following is an undeniable truism: “Politicians create the problems then leave them in the laps of the police.” - Karen Lee Torre, a New Haven trial lawyer, litigates civil rights issues in the federal courts. Her e-mail address is thimbleislands@sbcglobal.net.

Good Cops Outraged By Bad Cops

Good cops outraged by bad apples
The Beacon-News, A Chicago Sun-Times Publication by Kristen Ziman - December 5, 2011

In reference to my column where I talked about the Chicago Police Officer who tarnished our badge and our profession by falsifying an incident, a reader wondered if I get pushback from my fellow officers when I bring these topics to light because I’m supposedly breaking the “blue wall of silence” by illuminating these dark places. The answer is no. I sometimes feel like police officers get painted with a broad brush because the headlines report about corrupt officers leading people to believe that all police officers are dishonest. I can concede to the fact that there are police officers who should have never been allowed to assume the great responsibility that comes with the power they are afforded. I will admit that there are some police officers who use their position of authority in ways that serve themselves. There are police officers who take advantage of sick time and leave the officers who come to work every day to pick up their slack. While they exist, it is in minuscule percentages when compared to those officers who come to work every day and do their jobs with a warrior spirit and a servant heart. The people that disrespect their office and abuse their power exist in every profession. They exist in religious institutions, the medical profession, political office, and most recently, in the locker rooms of prestigious colleges. Give me any profession and I will show you someone who has violated the core principles of humanity and the organization they represent because of their own character flaws. The reason I don’t get any negative feedback on calling out the ones who don’t deserve to wear the badge is because the great majority of our officers are just as angry as the public at large about the lack of respect for the position they hold. In fact, the main reason institutions get into trouble in the first place is by failing to acknowledge when someone in their own organization does something devoid of ethics. Or worse, they cover up the wrong-doing in the hope that no one will find out about it. I don’t think the general public is naive enough to believe that no one will ever abuse their position of influence or office. But we expect that it be dealt with swiftly should it occur. When the Catholic Church covered up the sexual abuse allegations against priests, the public was outraged. When Penn State turned a blind eye to the heinous sex acts being committed on young boys by their beloved coach, we took issue. The same goes for the “thin blue line” in policing. In the police departments of old, I can assure you there was cover-up and corruption. But I can tell you with great confidence that the times have changed. In our profession, if you commit an act that is a disgrace to the badge, you stand alone. The thin, blue line of loyalty has dissipated because there are systems and processes in place by which cover-up and deceit only serve to get an officer unemployed. Blind loyalty is no more. Just like the public should be outraged when organizations attempt to cover up wrong-doing for the sake of avoiding a scandal, so should every person who is a part of the disgraced organization. The reason the police officers don’t get upset with my shining the light in dark places is because they don’t want those unworthy to wear the badge either. It takes immense moral courage to stand against a colleague who you know to be engaging in behavior that is destructive or illegal. And it takes even greater mental fortitude as the leaders of organizations where it is occurring to acknowledge it. But it must be done. Kristen Ziman can be reached at KristenZiman@gmail.com.

Dirty Cop Now Driving City Bus

Heist cop hired to drive B'klyn bus
The New York Post by Doug Auer and Jeffifer Fermino - December 5, 2011

He’s gone from Butch Cassidy to Ralph Kramden!

An infamous dirty cop — who was caught moonlighting as a bank robber in the 1990s — has a new gig driving a city bus in Brooklyn, The Post has learned. Former Queens cop Paul Voss is now working the night shift driving the B44 bus, some 13 years after his arrest for sticking up five banks — including one when he was on duty. The MTA knew all about his criminal past, but it decided to hire the badge-betraying bandit last April. The now-repentant 44-year-old copped to his unorthodox work history on both sides of the law when he applied to the transit agency and in subsequent employment interviews. But that didn’t preclude him from getting a job, thanks to strict state hiring laws. State agencies are forbidden from using candidates’ criminal histories against them in most cases. “He served a five-year sentence followed by eight consecutive years of gainful employment at a single company,” said MTA spokesman Kevin Ortiz. “Mr. Voss further revealed his criminal record and work history to the Background Investigations Unit of the NYC Department of Citywide Administrative Services, which upheld the hiring decision made by Transit.” After passing the civil-service bus-driver test, Voss was hired by the MTA at $20.38 an hour. That’s pocket change compared to what he was making during his stint as a bandit, when he netted a cool $17,000 for five quick heists in Queens from 1993 to 1997. MTA brass may have shrugged off his felonious past, but some regular riders of the B44 were a little uneasy. “Robbing a bank. That’s a serious charge,’’ said Louis Golden, 57, who rides Voss’ route from Bedford-Stuyvesant to Flatbush. Others were forgiving. “If he acknowledged he made a mistake, why shouldn’t we allow him redemption?” said passenger Teai Reid, 18. Now living in a cookie-cutter single-family home in Lindenhurst, LI, with his wife, the bank-robber-turned-civil servant refused to discuss his new vocation. He was equally taciturn when robbing banks back in the day. His MO involved wordlessly handing over notes demanding cash to terrified tellers. He flashed guns at three of them to show he meant business. At one point, a surveillance photo taken from one of Voss’ robberies was hung in his Queens precinct station house. A fellow cop thought the suspect looked like Voss, but discounted the possibility because it seemed too incredible, The Post reported in 1997. Eventually, Voss was caught in a joint investigation by NYPD Internal Affairs and the Queens DA. Fingerprints left at one of the robberies matched those of the cop. Additional reporting by Julia Marsh - dauer@nypost.com

Cop Tells Federal Judge He Abused His Position of Trust as Cop

Ex-Chicago cop pleads guilty to working for Latin Kings
The Chicago Sun-Times by Teresa Auch Schultz - December 3, 2011

Wearing a black-and-white striped prison outfit, former Chicago police officer Antonio Martinez Jr. admitted Friday morning that he used his badge to help steal drugs, guns and money from people in Illinois and Indiana for the Latin Kings. “Do you agree you abused your position of trust as a Chicago police officer?” U.S. District Judge Rudy Lozano asked Martinez in U.S. District Court in Hammond. “Yes, I do, your honor,” Martinez answered. Martinez, 40, described how co-defendant Sisto Bernal would give orders to him and his partner, Alex Guerrero, to shake down competing drug dealers and rival gang members by using their badges to coerce their way into homes and to pull over vehicles under the ruse of a legal traffic stop. Bernal would pay them in return for the stolen goods, Martinez said. Guerrero, 41, who is also charged in the case, and Bernal have both pleaded not guilty. “Yeah, basically my partner and I used our position of authority ... to not only facilitate but conduct various acts of criminal conduct,” he said. The men, along with 18 other defendants, were charged last month with conspiracy to racketeer along with numerous other drug, weapons and murder charges. Martinez reached an agreement with prosecutors to plead guilty to one count each of racketeering, conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, using violence to interfere with commerce and carrying a gun during a crime of violence. He faces between 15 years and life in prison on the charges, according to the plea agreement. Prosecutors will recommend, however, that he receive the minimum under federal sentencing guidelines, which will be established later. Martinez has agreed to testify against his co-defendants. Assistant U.S. Attorney David Nozick also described Martinez’s crimes, adding that he at various times collected drugs from Lake County, Ind., and would then give them to Bernal and co-defendant Alexander Vargas, 34, of Highland, Ind. On at least one occasion, Nozick said, Martinez went with Bernal to give the drugs to customers. He also helped steal drugs from a warehouse in Rockford, and rob numerous homes in Lake County, including the home of James Walsh in December 2006. Walsh, who was a leader of the rival Latin Dragons gang, was shot to death outside a Griffith restaurant a few months later. Prosecutors claim Vargas ordered the shooting in retaliation for his brother’s death. Martinez admitted he wore his Chicago Police badge and bulletproof vest, and used his department-issued gun, when committing the crimes, which included the armed robbery of a marijuana trafficker during a Chicago traffic stop; the armed robbery of a drug trafficker in East Chicago, Ind.; the armed robbery of a drug trafficker near South Massasoit Avenue in Chicago; and the armed robbery of a drug trafficker in Chicago while the trafficker and leader of the Latin Kings were conducting a drug deal, prosecutors said. He also admitted to the armed robbery of a woman at her Hammond home during which two guns were stolen. Nozick added that Martinez would often commit his crimes while he was on the clock as a Chicago cop. Lozano set a sentencing date for June 14, although he said it would likely be postponed if the rest of the co-defendants’ cases are not wrapped up by then. tauch@post-trib.com - Contributing: Tina Sfondeles

Retired Sheriff Charged in Meth-For-Sex Case, In Jail Named After Him

Ex-Colorado sheriff charged in meth-for-sex case
The Associated Press by P. Solomon Banda - December 2, 2011

DENVER, CO (AP) — A former Colorado lawman who was once named the nation's sheriff of the year was charged Friday with drug and prostitution offenses after authorities said he offered methamphetamine to a man in exchange for sex. Patrick Sullivan Jr., 68, was being held on $500,000 bond in an isolation cell at a jail named in his honor in suburban Denver. Arapahoe County Sheriff Grayson Robinson said current or former law enforcement officials are usually kept from the general inmate population for their safety at the Patrick J. Sullivan Jr. Detention Facility. Prosecutors charged Sullivan with felony distribution, possession of meth as well as a misdemeanor charge of soliciting prostitution. Authorities say he offered methamphetamine in exchange for sex from a male acquaintance in a sting set up by officers with a drug task force. Sullivan also is charged with attempting to influence a public servant following a Sept. 20 report of an "old man" inside a home that the caller said he wanted to leave. An incident report notes a man at the house reported Sullivan was getting three recovering addicts back into drugs. Sullivan told investigators he was helping them out as part of his work with a law enforcement and state drug rehab program. Officials have no record of Sullivan working for either. Sheriff's officials say Sullivan has declined to grant interviews while incarcerated. Sullivan was sheriff of the suburban Denver county from 1984 until 2002, when he retired. He was hailed as a hero following a daring 1989 rescue in which he crashed a vehicle through a fence to provide cover for two of his deputies who were pinned by gunfire. He was also named Sheriff of the Year by the National Sheriff's Association and praised by former Rep. Tom Tancredo in 2002. Meanwhile, Robinson said police talked to him in January about Sullivan as part of an investigation into the unsolved drowning death of a man. Robinson said a detective contacted him in January for insight into the personality of Sullivan. "He told me they were interested in interviewing Sullivan," Robinson said. Denver police refuse to say whether they questioned Sullivan or what information they sought in the Jan. 26 drowning death of 27-year-old Sean Moss. An autopsy found intoxication from meth and gamma-hydroxybutryic acid that's a rave drug known by various street names such as "Liquid Ecstasy," that's also a date rape drug, contributed to Moss' death. Police spokesman Sonny Jackson said the case remains open because the coroner was unable to determine if Moss' death was accidental, a suicide or homicide. The Denver Post reported that Sullivan had posted bail for Moss after his arrest Jan. 14 in a domestic violence case in Centennial, a suburb of Denver. That case involved a fight that broke out in a car on Interstate 25 between Moss and a man described by investigators as Moss' boyfriend, according to an incident report from the Arapahoe County sheriff's office. The incident report said Moss and the other man were living together at the time. Both men were arrested. Moss was carrying a backpack packed with a denture brush, eight pairs of socks, some clothes, and other personal items when his body was found in the South Platte River southeast of downtown Denver. Robinson said he knew little about the Moss investigation because that was Denver's case. A Denver man remained in custody in a Denver jail Friday over allegations he supplied methamphetamine to Sullivan. Robinson said Timothy Faase, 49, was arrested Tuesday after investigators tailed Sullivan to Faase's Denver apartment. Faase was being held in a Denver jail on suspicion of drug trafficking and possession of more than 2 grams of methamphetamine. His bond was set at $25,000.

Former Cop Pleads Guilty to Drug Conspiracy

FBI: Former Chicago Police Officer Pleads Guilty To Racketeering
ENEWSPF - December 3, 2011

Washington, D.C.-(ENEWSPF)- Antonio C. Martinez Jr., 40, a former Chicago police officer, pleaded guilty today to racketeering conspiracy and related charges, announced Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney David Capp of the Northern District of Indiana. Martinez pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Rudy Lozano to conspiracy to commit racketeering activity; conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana; robbery; and using a firearm while committing these federal crimes. Martinez was charged, along with 14 additional defendants, in a third superseding indictment unsealed on Nov. 18, 2011. To date, 21 individuals, including Martinez, have been charged for crimes related to their membership or association with the Almighty Latin Kings and Queen Nation (Latin Kings) gang. Martinez admitted that he committed a series of robberies from 2004 to 2006 at the direction of the Latin Kings, using his position as a Chicago police officer to facilitate the robberies. Martinez admitted that he was wearing his Chicago Police Department badge and department-issued weapon when he committed the robberies, which included those of drug traffickers in Rockford, Ill.; Chicago; and East Chicago, Ind. In one instance, Martinez admitted to participating in the armed robbery at the home of a deceased Latin Dragon gang leader in Hammond, Ind. In addition, Martinez admitted that he picked up and delivered packages of cocaine on multiple occasions for two Latin Kings leaders. Sentencing is scheduled for June 14, 2012. At sentencing, Martinez faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. The investigation of Martinez was conducted by the Chicago City Public Corruption Task Force, a Chicago Police Department-Internal Affairs and FBI Chicago law enforcement initiative. The investigation of the remaining defendants was conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; U.S. Immigration and Custom Office of Homeland Security Investigations; the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement & Coordination Center; the National Gang Intelligence Center; the Chicago Police Department; the East Chicago Police Department; the Griffith, Ind., Police Department; the Hammond Police Department; the Highland, Ind., Police Department; and the Houston Police Department. The cases are being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Joseph A. Cooley of the Criminal Division’s Organized Crime and Gang Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney David J. Nozick of the Northern District of Indiana.

Feds Take Over Syracuse Coach Sex Investigation

Feds take over investigation of fired Syracuse assistant basketball coach Bernie Fine
The New York Daily News by Chrisitan Red & Teri Thompson - November 28, 2011

Feds move in after feud between local authorities

The Carmelo K. Anthony Basketball Center at Syracuse University will be combed over by federal agents as they take over Bernie Fine case. Bernie Fine is now a federal case. Apparently seeking broader statutory support and perhaps an end to a bitter feud between local authorities, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York took the lead in the investigation into claims that Fine, the former Syracuse assistant basketball coach, sexually abused a former ball boy and two others. Syracuse police chief Frank Fowler issued a statement Monday afternoon saying the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the U.S. Secret Service would head the investigation. “We have now moved into a new phase of the investigation,” the release stated, adding that the Syracuse police department and Chief Frank Fowler are “committed to working with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the U.S. Secret Service in this investigation.” A source told the Daily News Monday that the Department of Education is also investigating the university to see if there was a failure to comply with the Clery Act, the federal statute that requires colleges and universities to report sexual abuse crimes. The DOE announced Nov. 9 that it was conducting a similar investigation at Penn State, where former football defensive coordinator Jerry Sandusky has been charged with 40 counts of sexual abuse of minors. Fowler also said Monday his office will hand over information about the case to Onondago County District Attorney Bill Fitzpatrick from 2002, when former Syracuse ball boy Bobby Davis reported to that city’s police that he had been molested by Fine. Davis was told then that the statute of limitations had run out on the accusations. A dispute had arisen between Fitzpatrick’s and Fowler’s offices over the handling of the explosive case in which Fine, an assistant to Jim Boeheim for 35 years, has been accused by Davis, his stepbrother and a third man, 23-year-old Zach Tomaselli of Lewiston, Me., of abusing them when they were boys. Syracuse police reopened the case on Nov. 17 when Davis again told police he had been molested. This time, Davis’ stepbrother, Mike Lang, told police he, too, had been molested by Fine. Fitzpatrick complained that police had not turned over information from Davis, then accused Fowler of leaking contents of an affidavit provided by Davis’ girlfriend, Danielle Roach, in which Roach said she had left messages with the DA’s office in 2002 to report the abuse but had not been called back by anyone. The two were headed to court Monday to resolve the dispute when Fowler agreed to turn over the information from the investigation.

“The Syracuse Police Department will provide the information requested by the Onandaga County District Attorney’s Office on Tuesday,” Fowler’s office said. Fitzpatrick said Monday that he, too, would cooperate fully with the federal investigation, saying he has been “in close contact with the U.S. Attorney.” “We’re acting in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney’s Office,” he said. “I’m not doing anything without checking with them.” Fitzpatrick said the investigation centers on determining if Fine can be prosecuted. “The U.S. Attorney is, as I am, interested in finding out if there are any prosecutable (persons),” Fitzpatrick said. For the feds to assume jurisdiction in the investigation, they would have to rely on statutory authority that could include a range of crimes that wouldn’t violate statute of limitations constraints, including sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child under 18; crossing state lines to commit a crime against a child; or the use of interstate commerce, or the Internet, to commit a crime against a child. Pittsburgh police announced Monday they will open an investigation in conjunction with the existing investigations into Tomaselli’s claims that he was molested by Fine in January 2002 at a Pittsburgh hotel room, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported. Tomaselli was 13 at the time, and if proven, that alleged abuse might be prosecutable in federal court. “A federal case is difficult to overcome for a defendant,” said Tom Harvey, a New York criminal defense lawyer who is following the case for The News. “Their statutes are more wide-ranging and inclusive and can widen the statute of limitations. For a potential defendant to be under a federal investigation is never a good thing.”

Federal Judge Denies Bail to Accused Corrupt Cop

Federal judge denies bond request by Arkansas police officer accused in corruption scheme
The Associated Press - November 28, 2011

LITTLE ROCK, AK — A federal judge has denied a motion to allow a Helena-West Helena police officer to post bond while he awaits trial for his alleged role in a drug-trafficking and corruption scheme in eastern Arkansas. U.S. District Judge James Moody wrote in an order issued Monday that there is evidence that Robert Rogers is a danger to the community, and that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of (the defendant) as required and the safety of any other person and the community." U.S. District Judge James Moody wrote in an order issued Monday that there is evidence that Robert Rogers is a danger to the community, and that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of (the defendant) as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Rogers and four other officers are accused of taking bribes to protect drug shipments and overlook offenses in a four-year investigation dubbed "Operation Delta Blues." Seventy people have been indicted. Assistant Federal Public Defender Justin Eisele didn't immediately return a call seeking comment.

Ticket-Fix Witness Warned to Leave Town

Ticket-fix witness warned to leave NY
The New York Post by Jamie Schram and Jeane MacIntosh - November 28, 2011

Authorities have told a key informant in the Bronx ticket-fixing scandal to stay out of town for a while, The Post has learned. But the investigators have not told the witness, who helped build Bronx DA Robert Johnson’s case against alleged dirty cop José Ramos, why he should make himself scarce — or even whether he’s the target of threats, sources said. The informant just got a call telling him to keep away at least a week, the sources said. A Johnson spokesman declined comment. The witness helped cops target the 18-year NYPD veteran, whose reputed ties to Bronx drug dealer Lee King sparked the ticket-fixing probe. According to details obtained by The Post, the informant, working with undercover cops, helped lure Ramos to an uptown hotel, where the rogue officer planned to steal what he thought was $60,000 in drug money, sources said. Video surveillance had been set up in the room. The informant went in first, after which Ramos strolled in and took all the cash he could find — $20,000, the sources said. The development came as a trio of police-union honchos indicted in the scandal prepared to fight for their right to continue to be paid while doing union work. The officers — Brian McGuckin, Michael Hernandez and Joseph Anthony — had been suspended for 30 days after being accused of official misconduct and tampering with public records. Their suspension expires today — and the Police Department has indicated it will send them back to a regular department assignment. But their lawyers are set to argue in Manhattan Supreme Court tomorrow that they should be allowed to return to their union duties on the NYPD’s dime, as per their contract.

Police Chief Arrested on Embezzlement and ID Theft

Platteville police chief arrested on embezzlement and ID theft charges
The Greeley Tribune by Nate A. Miller - November 30, 2011

Authorities: Chief used officers’ info to steal funds for gas

Platteville’s police chief has resigned after being accused of using the Social Security numbers of his fellow officers to illegally use police department fuel cards to buy gas for his own vehicle. Scott Alan Smith, 47, surrendered to Morgan County Sheriff’s Office deputies and was released Monday night, a sheriff’s spokeswoman said Tuesday. He was accused of one count of embezzlement and two counts of identity theft, both felonies. At his rural Eaton home Tuesday, Smith declined to comment about the accusations. According to an arrest affidavit from the Weld District Attorney’s Office, investigators identified 14 suspicious gasoline purchases between March 3 and Sept. 19 that totaled $392.40. The affidavit stated that each officer is assigned a personal identification number — the last four digits of the officer’s Social Security number — for the fuel cards. Smith is accused of tapping into the Colorado Crime Information Center to obtain driver’s license information on police officers, which included the Social Security numbers. The affidavit also stated the Platteville Police Department has a small fleet of police vehicles, which officers fuel at area gas stations and convenience stores. Each car is assigned a unique fuel card. According to the affidavit, after being confronted with the accusations, Smith told an investigator he violated department policy by taking patrol cars home. “He also stated he had used police department fuel cards to put gas into his personal vehicle,” the affidavit stated. “He stated he knew this was wrong. He stated he had permission to take a ‘gas allowance’ from two of the town board members.” Smith told the investigator he had been at the home of one of the board members for a party. “A discussion was held regarding the defendant not being paid what he and they believed he should be paid,” the affidavit stated. When Smith “mentioned a gas allowance would help, he was told by one of the town board members to go ahead and take such an allowance.” In the affidavit, Smith identified the town board trustees as Bonnie Dunston and Joe Rudd. Dunston told The Tribune she couldn’t comment about the case because it was under investigation. However, in the affidavit, she told an investigator she does not have the authority to approve such a request, and she would be opposed to an employee paying for personal gas with the town’s money. Rudd, who did not return phone calls from The Tribune seeking comment, told the investigator “he would not authorize such transactions, nor did he have the authority to do so,” the affidavit stated. Town Manager Troy Renken said Smith submitted a letter of resignation Nov. 9 and made his resignation effective Nov. 11. Renken said the town had just begun advertising the open police chief position, and the department’s sergeants and Renken — a former Platteville police chief — would handle the chief’s duties while the search for a replacement was conducted. “It will go for several weeks now and then a hiring committee will be formed to fill that position,” he said. Renken said he did not think the town needed to adjust what it pays the chief. “I think the salary is pretty competitive with other agencies our size,” he said. “I think all of us would like to make more money than we do.” NMILLER@GREELEYTRIBUNE.COM

Police Captain Voids Ticket to Lieutenant

Concord Cop Gives Off-Duty Police Lieutenant a Ticket, Captain Voids it “In the Interest of Justice”
Claycord.com - November 28, 2011

On October 7th at 8:37am, an off-duty Concord Police Lieutenant was issued a citation by a Concord Police Officer for the Lieutenant’s role in a traffic collision on Galindo Street, directly in front of the Concord Police Department. The off-duty Lieutenant, identified by the City of Concord as Robin Heinemann, was responsible for the collision, according to the City Attorney’s Office. The collision report states, according to sources, that Lt. Heinemann was making a left turn into the Police Department’s Driveway from Galindo when she failed to yield to oncoming traffic, causing a two-vehicle collision. Lt. Heinemann was then issued a citation by Officer Ron Bruckert for violating vehicle code section 21801a (failure to yield to oncoming traffic during a left turn movement). Ten days after the citation was issued to Lt. Heinemann, it was voided by Concord Police Captain David Downing. In a supplemental report, which was viewed by Claycord.com, Downing states “After conducting a review with Off. Bruckert, Sgt. Nunes, Lt. Graham & Lt. Heinemann concerning the accident, I decided to rescind the citation (#32-669043) to driver #1 in the interest of justice.” Captain David Downing was asked what he meant by “in the interest of justice“, and although he acknowledged our request for a comment, he did not answer the question. Claycord.com also tried to obtain the full report and the voided citation, but was denied by the Concord City Attorney’s Office. Concord Police Chief Guy Swanger was also contacted, but claimed the City Attorney’s Office had already answered our question. According to the California Courts website, the fine for a failure to yield to oncoming traffic citation is about $234.